

# **SUMMARY FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT**

(Enter Name, Role and Locus of officer originating request for advice)

AIC	Alea Commander (AC)			
C:		(Enter Name, Role and Locus of officer completing IRS, if different from above)		
cident	t Details:			
Inc	cident No:	12518		
	te/Time of Call:	Friday 8 July 2022 at 1636hrs		
	ldress:	Suez, Hareness Place Altens, Aberdeen AB12 3GX		
Ou	utline Details:	At 1636hrs on Friday 8 July 2022, Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) Dundee Operations Control (DOC) received an emergency call reporting a fire at Suez, Hareness Place Altens, Aberdeen. DOC mobilised a Rescue Pump (RP) from Altens Fire Station with Crew Commander (CC) in charge. Altens booked in attendance at 1644hrs. CC assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC).		
		At 1648hrs the IC sent an assistance message to DOC requesting make pumps two (one additional RP) stating this was for Breathing Apparatus (BA), fire within recycle yard. DOC mobilised another appliance from Altens Fire Station with Watch Commander (WC) in charge. They booked in attendance at 1653hrs.		
		At 1655hrs the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating a refuse centre on one floor, measuring approximately 60m by 100m. Fire within ground floor storage area. Two BA in rapid deployment and one main jet were being used. Crews were in Oscar Offensive Mode.		
		At 1701hrs WC sent an assistance message to DOC stating this was now a Level 2 incident (four additional RP's), Command Support Unit (CSU) not required. The IC further stated Rendezvous Point (RVP) for further appliances will be at the front of the building, further information to follow.		
		At 1707hrs the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating recycling plant building measuring approximately 100m by 60m. There was 50m by 40m of mixed waste approximately 10m in height well alight. Two BA in		

oncoming appliances.

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Stage 1 and one main jet were being used, awaiting on the arrival of

At 1714hrs Station Commander (SC) booked in attendance at the

incident.

At 1728hrs Group Commander (GC) booked in attendance at the incident.

At 1741hrs the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating SC had been fully briefed and now IC, WC Ops Commander, the incident was sectorised. Sector 1, CC in charge. Sector 3, WC in charge, Q03P1 was now Command Support (CS). Four BA and two main jets under Stage 1 procedures were being used. The IC further stated crews were currently in Delta Defensive Mode, Analytical Risk Assessment (ARA) underway and Safety Officer was CC.

At 1754 the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating GC had been fully briefed and now IC.

At 1803hrs the IC sent an assistance message to DOC requesting height vehicle (HV) and welfare pod required at incident.

At 1808hrs the IC sent an assistance message to DOC requesting water carrier required at incident.

At 1844hrs the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating Sector 1 continuing to contain fire, two BA Stage 1, one jet and one monitor were being used. Sector 2 now open, WC Sector Commander and standing by to proceed with ventilation, nothing in use. Sector 3 undertaking a watching brief, nothing in use. BA Sector WC, Water Sector CC, Health and Safety Functional Officer SC. The IC further stated ARA now completed and communicated to all, Firefighter Safety Resource (FSR) Officer SC. Withdraw plan complete and sufficient. Control measure complete, Functional Officer and Ops Assurance SC. HV now in attendance and being set up in Sector 1. Crew welfare had been reviewed and was sufficient. A multi agency meeting will be held at 1845hrs with Police Scotland (PS) and Scottish Ambulance service (SAS).

At 1908hrs the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating CSU now command pump.

At 1930hrs the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating Sector 1, Sector Commander was WC, fire now contained and surrounded within building, two BA, one main jet and one monitor were being used, HV operating within Sector as observation platform. Sector 2 undertaking watching brief, Sector 3, Sector Commander WC. Sector preparing for positive pressure ventilation (PPV), setting up six PPV fans. Water Sector CC, water carrier in attendance setting up dam for ferrying water. Sprinklers were being used, fed from mains supply, BA Sector CC. Incident Support Vehicle (ISV) in attendance supporting BA Sector. The IC further stated utilities had not been isolated to allow use of

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suppression systems, ARA reviewed and communicated to all, crew welfare reviewed and sufficient at this time, hydration strategy implemented. Can DOC contact Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) to make them aware of incident, fire run off was being contained within premise interceptor tanks, large volume of smoke from general waste of unknown materials, request SFRS media officer be informed of incident.

At 2029hrs the IC sent an informative message to DOC stating Sector 1, site engineer assisting with removal of refuse for dampening down utilising site machinery with positive pressure contained cabs, engineer working within inner cordon, crews dampening down refuse, two main jets were being used, Marshalling Officer in use. Sector 2, two PPV fans were being used for positive pressure ventilation. Sector 3, natural ventilation only. Second multi agency meeting now complete, outcomes of joint understanding of risk agreed, joint tactical plans agreed, media strategy agreed with PS. PS now released from incident, SAS Special Operations Response Team (SORT) remaining on scene for firefighter safety, crew welfare reviewed and satisfactory, welfare unit in attendance and operational. The IC further stated ARA updated and communicated to all personnel, utilities remain on for use of suppression systems, HV will be released from incident in approximately ten minutes, this will be a protracted incident.

At 2051hrs the IC sent a Stop Message to DOC stating Sector 1 BA discontinued, two on site diggers removing waste to open air, crews dampening down, two main jets, FPPP dust masks were being used for crew safety. Sector 2 PPV fans were being used. Sector 3 now closed. BA Sector now closed, crew welfare reviewed and sufficient. Welfare unit to be released from incident in thirty minutes, welfare will be utilised using onsite facilities. Stonehaven and Kintore to be released from incident in fifteen minutes. Central to be released in thirty minutes. Altens to be released from incident in forty minutes. The IC further stated ARA had been reviewed and communicated to all.

### Saturday 9 July 2022

The incident escalated in the early hours of the morning. This was a protracted incident and finally concluded on Wednesday 13 July 2022.

#### **Advice**

Advice Requested:	At 0819hrs on Monday 11 July 2022 Fire Investigation Officer (FIO) WC Caddell contacted Area Commander (AC) to gather preliminary information. AC stated SFRS were in attendance at a Level 2 incident.
Advice Given:	At approximately 1300hrs on Wednesday 13 July 2022, FIO's WC McMillan and WC Caddell attended the incident to assist SFRS with a Level 2 investigation.  The building involved was a recycling plant, consisting of one floor, with an office block attached to the frontside of the building. The office block

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consisted of three floors. The building measured approximately 100 metres by 60 metres and 10m in height. The building was a single storey steel portal frame building with block construction walls and boxed steel Structural Isulated Panels (SIPS) on the walls and steel profile roof with fibreglass roof lights. There was seperation to a separate facility with a 10m high concrete wall. There were multiple rear doors to the building. These doors were approximately six meters in height and three metres in width and were a roll over type. The floor was of concrete construction. The building was serviced with mains electricity from an onsite sub station.

The building had sustained severe fire, heat and smoke damage throughout. The roof had partially collapsed inside onto the floor, and sections of the concrete internal walls were cracked and unstable.

Due to the high level of structural instability sustained from fire and heat damage, access inside the building was restricted. An excavation of the fire debris was therefore not undertaken.

The building had been in operation the day off the fire. This was consistent with the statements from the fire crews and onsite personnel. The building stored approximately 550 tonnes of Dry Mixed Recycle (DMR) at the time of the fire. The post fire indicators showed that the DMR material was stored to two thirds of the height of the four metre separating concrete walls. These walls did not go to the roof of the building. This material would be placed into a hopper by a mechanical digger to be processed by the Material Recovery Facility.

The fire started within the DMR in Bay B of the building. This was consistent with statements from SFRS crews and onsite personnel. There were no electrical sources in Bay B. The electrical supply was not isolated at the start of firefighting operations as the buildings sprinkler suppression systems were continuing to assist with firefighting operations.

### **OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION:**

The building stored approximately 550 tonnes of Dry Mixed Recycle (DMR) at the time of the fire

## **Deliberate Ignition:**

Following enquiries by PS there was no evidence of any unauthorised persons having been in the building immediately prior to the fire starting. Deliberate ignition was considered and was discounted as the cause of

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this fire.

### Fault or failure within an electrical appliance or distribution system:

The building was supplied with mains electricity from an onsite sub station which was live at the time of the fire. This was consistent with the statements from fire crews. Due to the high level of structural instability sustained from fire and heat damage a full excavation could not be completed. The fire originated within DMR in bay B of the building. There were no electrical sources in Bay B. Fault or failure within an electrical appliance or distribution system was considered and discounted as a cause of this fire.

### **Accidental Ignition:**

There were no electrical sources in Bay B. We were unable to excavate and establish if there were any lithium batteries, discarded barbeque coals, gas disposable lighters or other ignition sources within the DMR in Bay B of the building. The fire within the DMR in Bay B of the building was consistent with statements from SFRS crews and onsite personnel. Accidental ignition of material within Bay B was considered and could not be rules out as a cause of this fire.

#### Conclusion:

Due to the high level of structural instability sustained from fire and heat damage, access inside was not possible. An excavation of the fire debris was therefore not undertaken. Having considered all the above information that this incident should be recorded as an accidental fire, however the official cause would be recorded as undetermined.

Reas	son for delayed submission:	(Enter if report dated more than 7 days after incident date)
	Not Applicable	

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